董事会作为公司的决策机构，行使决策职能和对经理人员的评价与监督职能，其运行质量如何，是关系到公司长远发展与广大股东利益的关键所在，并对公司绩效产生重大影响。因此探寻董事会有效性及其影响因素，对激励董事会成员行为、完善董事会结构、促进公司长远发展及实现利益相关者的利益最大化等具有重要意义。并且，现有许多研究仅仅把董事会看作一个黑箱，直接测量董事会特征对公司绩效的影响，而忽视了董事会具体做些什么、如何运转，也没有深入了解董事会的运行效率及其影响因素。然而，只有深入到董事会这个黑箱之内，才会发现董事会到底如何运转，而董事会中的董事的行为如何影响董事会的运行效率才会得以发掘处理。因此，进一步研究董事行为是如何在董事运转中起作用的就越发有意义。

本文在一委托人多代理人理论以及关于董事行为、董事会特征与董事会有效性相关文献的研究基础上，本文首先对董事会行为、董事会特征以及董事会有效性的概念进行了重新定义。董事会行为包括董事会合作行为和董事会领导行为，而董事合作行为又受董事会领导行为方式的影响，并且董事合作不仅属于董事会成员之间的责任规范、制度硬性规定使然还是董事之间的互动行为使然；董事会特征包括董事会构成、董事会领导结构和董事会规模三个方面；董事会有效性界定为董事会服务和控制绩效如何满足董事会角色行为预期以及董事会的制度特征。其次，为了便于分析，本文界定了董事会有效性指标，以及构建了包括董事会行为指标和董事会特征指标在内的董事会有效性评价体系；其中，董事会行为指标包括董事会互动行为指标和董事会领导行为指标两个方面，董事会特征指标包括董事构成指标、董事会领导结构指标和董事会规模指标三个方面。接着，本文通过引入多代理人合作模型，得到模型解释参数；参数的理论含义为产出相关系数，实际上反映了董事会成员之间的角色预期相关度。然后，在上述基础上，本文以2013年的民营上市公司为数据样本，运用Probit计量模型对我国370家A股民营上市公司进行了实证分析。最后，本文研究结果显示：董事会在制度上对董事成员合作行为所作的硬性规定对由董事会服务角色绩效和控制角色绩效构成的董事会有效性都会起促进作用，而董事会的领导行为则单独会对反映董事会有效性方面的控制角色绩效起作用，董事会成员的多样性也会使得董事会在服务角色和控制角色方面的有效性影响更加显著，而董事会规模对董事会的控制角色绩效方面有效性的影响更为微弱；同时，本文的实证分析结果也符合多代理人合作模型所作的解释。

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